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Abstract 
We empirically study the information-persuasion trade-off in advertising using data on the information 
content of advertisements, which we measure with the number of information cues in ads. We propose a 
simple theoretical framework to motivate an ordered probit model of information content. We find that 
stronger vertical differentiation is positively associated with the delivery of more product information in a 
brand’s advertisements: brands with higher levels of quality include more information cues. Next, 
comparative advertisements contain significantly more product information than self-promotional 
advertisements. Finally, brands with higher market shares and brands competing against strong generic 
substitutes have less information content. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We develop an empirical study of how much information brands choose to disclose in 
advertisements. Recent theoretical contributions have analyzed this choice (Anderson and Renault, 
2009; Guo and Zhao, 2009; Sun, 2011). In parallel, recent empirical contributions have coded 
advertising content (Bertrand et al., 2010; Liaukonyte, 2012; Anderson et al., 2012 (ACLR); and 
Ching et al., 2011) to better understand the impact of advertising. We contribute to this growing 
empirical literature by explaining the number of information cues in advertisements through 
underlying product characteristics and other market fundamentals, and we theoretically found the 
use of the ordered probit model in content analysis. 
We maintain that there exists an optimal amount of information to be included in an 
advertisement. Advertisements that provide too little objective information about the brand arguably 
waste the opportunity to sufficiently convince prospective consumers to buy it (Jacoby, 1977). 
Conversely, those that provide too much information may crowd the ad message and lead to 
information overload for the consumer (Chervany and Dickson, 1974; Pieters, Wedel and Zhang, 
2007). Factors such as motivation and the ability to process information mediate individual 
responses to advertising (Cacioppo and Petty, 1985; MacInnis and Jaworski, 1989). Therefore, 
including too many information cues can create attention wear-out (Pieters, Warlop and Wedel, 
2002), which suggests that there is an optimal degree of information content.  
The underlying notion behind our empirical analysis is that there is a trade-off between the 
informative and persuasive roles of advertising, subject to random factors intrinsic to specific ads. 
In our approach, the “persuasive” content of an ad is interpreted as the content that is not objective 
information. We treat the persuasive component of an advertisement as unobserved. The theoretical 
framework that we develop assumes that the amount of information in the ad is directly proportional 
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to the number of information cues mentioned in the ad (and inversely related to the persuasive 
component of an ad). 
The optimal amount of information content may vary systematically across brands and may 
be partially explained by observable factors such as brand type, brand size, suitability of various 
combinations of information, and recent news about the product. To study this variation, we use an 
ordered probit model of the number of information cues in advertisements as a function of the 
market share of a brand, its core vertical characteristics, and the market share of the generic 
substitute. To motivate the use of an ordered probit, we develop a simple and intuitive framework in 
which firms decide how much objective information to include in an advertisement. 
As predicted by our theoretical model, we find that stronger vertical differentiation, 
measured by the characteristic advantage of a product relative to its competitors, is positively 
associated with more information. Likewise, a higher market share of the generic version of a brand 
is associated with less informative ads.  We also find that comparative advertisements contain 
significantly more information than self-promotional advertisements, and that larger brands provide 
less information. Finally, we show that significant estimation bias results from not controlling for 
the endogeneity of the decision to use comparative advertising and from the endogeneity of market 
shares.  
Our analysis contributes to the sparse empirical literature on the persuasive vs. informative 
content of advertising, which mostly makes use of advertising expenditure/exposure data to analyze 
a priori assumed informative or persuasive roles of advertising (see Bagwell, 2007, for a 
comprehensive survey). Several papers use insightful identification strategies to separately quantify 
the informative and persuasive components of advertising (Leffler, 1981; Ackerberg, 2001, 2003; 
Ching and Ishihara, 2012). Ackerberg (2001, 2003) maintains that advertising is only informative 
for first-time buyers, while it is both informative and persuasive for repeat buyers. Ching and 
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Ishihara (2012) assume that the informative component of advertising is specific to the exogenous 
characteristics of a product and the persuasive component is brand specific. Basuroy, Rao, and 
Ravid (2011) identify the persuasive and informative effect of advertising utilizing the assumption 
that if the persuasive role is important, then one would expect the number and quality of reviews 
included in a movie promotion to play a major role in the success of the advertisement.  
Although the identification strategies of these existing works are clever and rely on the 
interaction between choice behavior and advertising, they still suffer from the limitations that they 
only use data on advertising expenditure or number of advertisement exposures instead of the actual 
content of advertisements. Our approach is fundamentally different because we explicitly code the 
information content. This enables us to distinguish between the informative and the persuasive role 
of advertising directly from the advertising content data.  
Several recent contributions exploit advertising content data but study different questions. 
Liaukonyte (2012) codes the content of advertisements to distinguish the impact of comparative and 
self-promotional advertising on demand. Ching et al. (2011) study that the impact of the content of 
media coverage on anti-cholesterol drugs on consumer demand varies by publicity type. Finally, 
Bertrand et al. (2010) develop a field experiment in South Africa and show that advertising content 
significantly affects demand for loans. In contrast, we focus on firm behavior rather than on the 
effect of advertising on demand. Another paper closely related to ours is ACLR (2012), which uses 
the same data source to investigate how firms strategically use comparative advertising and 
measures the magnitude of the damage inflicted with comparative advertising. Our paper differs 
from ACLR (2012) because we focus on the amount of information content of advertising and we 
explain it with an ordered probit model. 
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2. Advertising Content and the Information-Persuasion Trade-off Model 
 
Information in advertisements can be (1) about the brand, brand attributes, benefits, users, or usage 
situation; (2) cognitive, emotional or subconscious; or (3) contextual information, including 
consumers’ past experiences (MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski, 2001; Vakratsas and Ambler, 
1999). We focus on the first aspect of brand information (traceable, objective information cues) and 
treat cognitive, emotional, and contextual information as the untraceable, subjective element of an 
advertisement. We define this subjective unobserved element as the persuasive component.5  
Contrary to the classic content analysis, which determines the fraction of advertisements that 
fall into each category given a number of cues and uses univariate analysis to compare scenarios 
(see e.g., Resnik and Stern, 1977), we use an ordered probit model to study the determinants of the 
distribution of cues. We now present a simple way to motivate the use of an ordered probit in this 
context. 
We maintain that firms face a trade-off: given the limited amount of time available in an 
advertisement, the firm must decide how much of that time to allocate to providing information and 
how much of it to allocate to persuading consumers to buy the brand through the use of channels 
other than objective information. We assume that the persuasive power of an advertisement depends 
on the number of seconds devoted to the persuasive component, and a random term, which reflects 
the idiosyncratic features of a particular advertisement. Let the persuasive power of the ad be 
ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ ൌ ሺ݌̅ െ ߝሻݏ 
                                                 
5 The persuasive component can also be traceable in well-defined studies (e.g., Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy, 1990), 
but it is outside of the scope of this paper.  
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where s is the number of seconds spent on persuasion, ݌̅ is a constant and ε is a random term.6  
Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates the function P(s,ε). The x-axis indicates the number of seconds used 
for persuasion. As more time is allocated to persuasion, the function P(s,ε) increases from right to 
left. The y-axis shows the total benefit from persuasion. The more time spent on persuasion, the 
larger the total benefit. 
The marginal persuasion for an advertisement with s seconds of persuasion and a given draw 
of the random term ε is therefore ݌̅ െ ߝ. The persuasion function is linear, and therefore the 
marginal persuasion does not change with the share of the advertisement that is allocated to it.  
Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the function ݌̅ െ ߝ. The x-axis again indicates the number of seconds 
used for persuasion. Because ݌̅ െ ߝ does not change with s, the function ݌̅ െ ߝ is parallel to the x-
axis. The y-axis depicts the marginal benefit of persuasion. In the empirical implementation of the 
econometric model that we are developing here, ݌̅ will vary according to the observable features of 
the advertised brand (e.g., market share, observable quality, generic competition, etc.) and of the 
advertisement itself, such as whether it is a comparative or self-promotional advertisement. 
  
                                                 
6 P(s,ε) does not have to be linear in s. It should be an increasing and concave function of s. The linear specification 
simplifies the exposition significantly. 
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Figure 1. Trade-off Between Informative and Persuasive Content 
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Let each information cue take ̅ݏ seconds to convey, so that if there are S seconds in the ad 
(i.e., n information cues are conveyed), there are s=S-n̅ݏ seconds of persuasion. Let Ii be the benefit 
of the ith information cue i, with i=1,...,n. We assume that firms rank the cues from the highest to 
the lowest information benefit for each given advertisement. We do not observe such information 
cue ranking, however we assume that the inclusion of the observed cues is based on a firm’s 
intrinsic ranking. Note that our theory is consistent with rankings varying across different types of 
advertisements for the same brand, since advertisements can be tailored to appeal to target 
demographics who value product characteristics differently. Clearly, the brand will choose to 
include the cues delivering the highest information benefit, i.e., those cues for which the values of Ii 
are the highest.  
Because a given advertisement only has a limited amount of available time, S, the brand 
must decide how much of that time to allocate to providing information vs. for persuasion. This 
trade-off and the total benefit of information are depicted in Panel A of Figure 1. Panel B of Figure 
1 shows the marginal benefit of information, which is decreasing in the amount of information 
already provided. The marginal benefit of information is also a step function. The firm chooses s 
(or, alternatively, n) to maximize the sum of the total benefit of persuasion and the total benefit of 
information.  Formally, the firm solves: 
ቐ
max௦ ܦሺ∑ ܫ௜ ൅ ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ
௡௜ୀଵ ሻ
ݏ. ݐ.   ݊ ൌ ܵ െ ݏ̅ݏ .
 
Here D(.) is an increasing function representing the firm’s demand as a function of an 
advertisement’s information and persuasion content. The solution to this optimization problem can 
be described by comparing the incremental benefit from adding a cue to the advertisement to the 
opportunity cost of reducing the time spent on persuasion. If the advertisement contains n-1 cues, 
then the extra benefit from the nth cue is In. We can see this graphically in Panel A of Figure 1. 
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There we see that I₄, the marginal benefit of the fourth information cue, is larger than I₅, the 
marginal benefit of the fifth information cue. The slope of the persuasion function, ݌̅ െ ߝ, is such 
that:  
I₅ < ̅ݏሺ݌̅ െ ߝሻ < I₄. 
This implies that the optimal number of cues depicted in Panel A of Figure 1 is four. 
Panel B of Figure 1 shows this solution in a way that allows us to introduce our ordered 
probit in a straightforward way. Define for all Ii the value εi such that 
ܫ௜ ൌ ሺ݌̅ െ ߝ௜ሻ ̅ݏ, 
so that εi is the threshold value of the random error such that the firm chooses to include at least i 
information cues in the advertisement if ε > εi. In Figure 1, Panel A depicts ε₄ < ε < ε₅. Hence, in 
this particular illustration, the brand chooses to include four information cues in the advertisement. 
Accounting for the fact that there can be no fewer than zero cues and no more than ܥ ൌ ܵ/̅ݏ, 
we have the following mapping from the value of ε to the number of cues, here denoted by y: 
 y = 0, for ε ≤  ε₁ 
       ... 
 y = i,  for εi < ε ≤  εi+1 
      ... 
     y = n, for ε > εn. 
The basic intuition of this statistical model is the following: when the (negative) random 
shock is very small (ε < ε₁) — which implies that an advertisement has the ability to have very 
strong persuasive power (relative to the benefit of information in that particular advertisement) — 
then the firm has no incentive to include information cues. As the persuasive power of an 
advertisement decreases, the firm chooses to include more information cues. 
From the specification above we can construct a probability distribution of observing the 
corresponding number of cues, where F( . ) denotes the cumulative distribution of ε: 
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   y = 0, with probability F(ε₁) 
      ... 
   y = i,  with probability F(εi+1) - F(εi) 
      ... 
   y = n, with probability 1 - F(εn). 
If F(.) is normally distributed, the formulation corresponds to an ordered probit model.7 In 
particular, we show how the probability function in the model above can be written as the textbook 
version of the ordered probit, where ߝ௜ ൌ ߙ௜ െ ܺߚ and therefore ܨሺߝ௜ሻ ൌ Φሺߙ௜ െ ܺߚሻ.  In this 
ordered probit specification, the unobserved components, i.e. ε,  are drawn from a normal 
distribution, and the cutoff values (αi) are such that the realization of a latent variable (explained 
component plus noise) lies within a range that corresponds to each specific number of cues.8 ߚ is a 
ܭ ൈ 1 vector of parameters, and ܺ is a ܭ ൈ 1 vector of observable features of the brand, which does 
not include a constant. For ߚ ൐ 0, an increase in X will lower the threshold εi which will in turn 
make it more desirable to add additional information cues. Therefore, for ߚ ൐ 0, larger Xs are 
associated with more information content in an advertisement. 
We can rewrite ܨሺߝ௜ሻ ൌ Φሺߙ௜ െ ܺߚሻ. First, recall that ߝ௜ ൌ ݌̅ െ ூ೔௦̅ . Here ݌̅ is a variable, the 
value of which determines the benefit of persuasion content. Hence, we set ߙ௜ െ ܺߚ ൌ ݌̅ െ ூ೔௦̅ . It is 
useful to extract a constant from െ ூ೔௦̅  and to rewrite the equality as ߙ௜ െ ܺߚ ൌ ݌̅ െ ܫ ̅ െ
ூሚ೔
௦̅ . Then 
ܺߚ ൌ ܫ̅ െ ݌̅ so that, consistent with the discussion in the preceding paragraph, the X variables 
increase the benefit of information or, equivalently, decrease the benefit of persuasion. Second, we 
can define the cutoff value ߙ௜ ൌ െ ூሚ೔௦̅ , which determines whether the firm is including i or i+1 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive review of ordered models, see Greene (1997) and Woolridge (2001). 
8 For concreteness, we describe the random term as entering the persuasion power, but it could just as well enter the 
marginal information benefit described below. Or, indeed, the random term could enter on both sides and the analysis 
would then capture the net effect. 
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information cues. The econometric model does not identify the constant term ܫ ̅separately from the 
cutoffs ߙ௜, which we need to keep in mind when we interpret the cutoffs. 
In our framework, the cutoffs have a clear structural interpretation. In particular: 
ߙ௜ାଵ െ ߙ௜ ൌ ܫ௜ െ ܫ௜ାଵ̅ݏ . 
Thus, conditional on ̅ݏ (which is unobserved), differences in the cutoffs provide information 
on differences in the information benefits of an additional cue.  
We estimate this ordered probit model and use the results to examine the relationships 
between the fundamental variables (e.g., the market share of a firm) and the number of information 
cues that a firm includes in an advertisement. Before discussing the relationships of interest, we 
state and prove a helpful result. 
 
Lemma 1. An increase in Ii stochastically increases the number of information cues. 
Proof. From the analysis above, i cues will be advertised if ε ∈  (εi, εi+1), where, as above, 
ߝ௜ ൌ ݌̅ െ ூ೔௦̅ . The corresponding probability of observing i cues is Pi = F(εi+1) െ F(εi), or 
 Pi =F(݌ െ ூ೔శభ௦ ) െܨ ቀ݌ െ
ூ೔
௦ቁ.  Suppose now that Ii increases while retaining its position as the ith 
largest information benefit. Then Pi increases at the expense of Pi-1, while all other probabilities 
remain unchanged. Hence, the number of cues increases stochastically. Now suppose that the 
increase in Ii raises it to the jth highest cue, with j < i. Then each intervening cue is promoted so that 
the probability of observing at least that number of cues rises. The probability of observing i+1 cues 
or more stays the same, as does the probability of observing each number less than j. Again, the 
number of cues stochastically increases. QED 
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3. Testable Model Implications 
 
First, we consider intrinsic characteristics of a product, which include: strength of pain relief, 
relative efficacy, and safety. In the industry analyzed in this paper, these variables are naturally 
exogenous to the information decision since they depend on the medical properties of the active 
ingredients in analgesic pain relievers, which in turn are inflexibly regulated by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). Therefore, the direction of causality can be clearly identified, and we 
can investigate how different locations in the product characteristics space are associated with 
information disclosure. 
The driving idea here is that the information benefit to a brand from communicating a 
certain characteristic increases with the brand’s strength in that characteristic. Communicating a 
weak characteristic does not give as much incremental benefit as communicating a strong one. 
Additional strength in any particular cue will raise its relative information benefit and also make it 
more likely to be included in the advertisement. Thus, using the result from Lemma 1 we would 
expect that brands with higher levels of quality (on each of the quality dimensions for which we 
have data) will include more information cues in their advertisements. 
The second relationship we study is that of information disclosure and the size of the generic 
counterpart market. An important characteristic of our analyzed market and of many other 
consumer product categories is the presence of generic substitutes. To the extent that branded 
product advertisements disseminate information about the benefits of the chemical molecule, 
generic counterparts are likely to benefit from these promotional efforts. Our second testable 
implication extends this information externality argument that has been made in the literature that 
studies the competition between brand-name drugs and generic drugs (e.g., Caves et al., 1991).  
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The simple framework presented above does not provide any prediction about the presence 
of generic substitutes on information content. However, we can impose some restrictions to our 
theoretical framework that would lead to tighter predictions about this relationship. Consider the 
following simple specification for the objective function of a non-generic firm: 
ܦ ൭෍ܫ௜ ൅ ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൱ െ ܮ ൭ݏ௚,෍ܫ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
൱ , 
where ܦሺ∑ ܫ௜ ൅ ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ௡௜ୀଵ ሻ denotes the increase in demand for both the branded product and its 
generic counterpart, and ܮ൫ݏ௚, ∑ ܫ௜௡௜ୀଵ ൯ denotes the leakage to the generic. The leakage is assumed to 
be increasing in the generic market share, sg, and in the information content, ∑ ܫ௜௡௜ୀଵ .  Note that n 
information cues will be preferred to n+1 if : 
ܦሺ∑ ܫ௜ ൅ ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ௡௜ୀଵ ሻ െ ܮ൫ݏ௚, ∑ ܫ௜௡௜ୀଵ ൯ > ܦሺ∑ ܫ௜ ൅ ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ௡ାଵ௜ୀଵ ሻ െ ܮ൫ݏ௚, ∑ ܫ௜௡ାଵ௜ୀଵ ൯  
where we have let the argument n denote the use of the first n information cues. Rewriting this 
condition as ܮ൫ݏ௚, ∑ ܫ௜௡ାଵ௜ୀଵ ൯ െ ܮ൫ݏ௚, ∑ ܫ௜௡௜ୀଵ ൯  > ܦሺ∑ ܫ௜ ൅ ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ௡ାଵ௜ୀଵ ሻ െ ܦሺ∑ ܫ௜ ൅ ܲሺݏ, ߝሻ௡௜ୀଵ ሻ and 
noting that the right hand side of the inequality does not depend upon sg, then including the lower 
number of cues, n, is more likely to be preferred as the left hand side of the equation increases. That 
holds if the incremental leakage is increasing in sg. This is a natural condition given that the leakage 
itself is increasing in sg (for example, if leakage were proportional to generic market size times an 
increasing and concave function of information cues). This is consistent with the rationale that 
brands that emphasize product quality also provide free advertising for generic counterparts of their 
products9, and therefore this would decrease the incentive to include information in the ads. On the 
other hand, consumers of brands might not be inclined to consume generics, and, in that case, 
brands might include information in their ads, independently of the size of the generic counterpart. 
                                                 
9 Unlike other generic substitutes of consumer products, the quality of the active ingredients in the generic versions of 
OTC analgesics are (and, by regulation, have to be) identical to the quality of the active ingredients in the branded 
products, since the quality of these OTC drugs is overseen by the FDA.. 
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While this is an intuitive and interesting exercise, our empirical analysis will not impose any (sign) 
restriction on the relationship between the share of the generic counterpart and the amount of 
information included in an ad.  
Although the two implications tested in this paper may not be entirely surprising or novel 
from the theoretical viewpoint, testing them with empirical data is challenging since it is generally 
difficult to measure the product quality and information content of advertising objectively.  
 
 4. Other Economic Relationships of Interest 
 
Our theoretical framework does not provide any formal insights into the relationship between a 
brand’s market share and information content or incidence of comparative advertising and 
information content. One possible interpretation is for market shares and comparative advertising to 
be variables that shift the constant term ܫ ̅ in the theoretical model. More generally, these 
relationships hold empirical interest and we explore them by including them as control variables in 
our econometric specification.   
Larger brands might benefit less than smaller brands from providing information, since 
larger brands are already well known and have higher advertising goodwill and brand equity (Simon 
and Sullivan, 1993; Dekimpe and Hanssens, 1995). In other words, the incremental benefit for 
larger brands might be smaller because consumers are already more aware of the features of 
commonly used products.  
There is no existing theory that tells us whether comparative advertisements should include 
more or less information than self-promotional advertisements.10 We expect that more information 
would be conveyed by comparing two brands than by just promoting a single brand, and comparing 
                                                 
10 Each comparative advertisement must include at least one cue, because the comparison is made for at least one 
characteristic. We compare all self-promotional advertisements to all comparative advertisements, conditional on an 
advertisement having at least one cue.  
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relative performance provides a more precise and concrete reference point. Similarly, an 
advertisement with comparative content is likely to have a weaker persuasion effect, even if the 
amount of time devoted to persuasion is the same. This might happen because mentioning the other 
brand dilutes the persuasion since it reiterates the existence of the rival brand. Previous research 
(Chou, Franke, and Wilcox, 1987; Harmon, Razzouk, and Stern, 1983) has found that comparative 
advertisements have more information, and we expect to find similar patterns. In particular, we 
expect a comparative claim to both increase the marginal information and decrease the marginal 
persuasion benefit of an advertisement. Both effects would cause the number of cues to rise 
stochastically (see Figure 1). 
 
5. Data and Content Analysis 
 
5.1. Industry Description and Data 
We follow Liaukonyte (2012) and use sales and advertising data from the OTC analgesics industry 
in the United States.  The OTC analgesics market covers pain relief medications with four major 
active chemical ingredients: aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, and naproxen sodium. The 
nationally advertised brands include Tylenol (acetaminophen), Advil (ibuprofen), Motrin 
(ibuprofen), Aleve (naproxen sodium), Bayer (aspirin or combination), and Excedrin 
(acetaminophen or combination). 
We focus on the OTC analgesics industry for several reasons. First, television advertising 
constitutes a large fraction of total advertising in the industry, implying that it is the most important 
marketing strategy used by the industry to communicate to its consumers. Second, the products sold 
by firms differ significantly in their characteristics, so that there is a range of meaningful 
information to potentially communicate (Lancaster, 1971; Christou and Vettas, 2008). Third, the 
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information is concentrated in experience- and credence-based characteristics, which tend to be 
advertised, rather than search characteristics that consumers can learn in the store before purchase 
(Erdem, Keane and Sun, 2008). Fourth, product differentiation—both real and spurious—is 
important because we emphasize the trade-off between persuasion and information, with the 
optimal mix depending upon a product’s characteristics (Soberman, 2002). Finally, the type of cues 
mentioned (e.g., “strong,” “fast-acting”) are clearly identifiable, which enables us to avoid making 
any subjective judgments while coding the information cues. 
The brand and generic sales data come from AC Nielsen and consist of monthly 
observations of the prices, dollar sales, and revenue market shares of OTC analgesics in the national 
U.S. market for 58 months, from March 2001 to December 2005. We observe data on essential 
product attributes such as brand name and active ingredient of a drug, as well as strength and pill 
type. This product sales and characteristics data is supplemented with the efficacy data on the 
strength of pain relief, relative speed, and safety for each brand. We collected this information from 
peer-reviewed medical journals. Clinically, all four main active ingredients have varying degrees of 
side effects. Each active ingredient has a comparative advantage in at least one attribute dimension. 
For example, Aspirin (brand name – Bayer) is weak in pain relief but has low, almost nonexistent 
cardiovascular risk; Naproxen sodium (Aleve) is the most potent drug but is associated with very 
high gastrointestinal risk; Acetaminophen (Tylenol and Excedrin) has low gastrointestinal risk but 
is weak in pain relief and has medium cardiovascular risk and Ibuprofen (Advil and Motrin) and 
naproxen sodium–based brands (Aleve) have the highest cardiovascular risk but are also the fastest 
in pain relief. 
The advertising data come from TNS Media Intelligence and cover the entire U.S. OTC 
analgesics product category. The dataset contains video files of all unique advertisement creatives 
and monthly expenditures associated with airing them nationally from 2001 to 2005. The 
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advertising numbers also include expenditures on other media, but almost all the advertising 
budgets (approximately 90%) were spent on television advertising, including network and cable 
networks. In our analysis, we examine only the television advertising data.  We watched 4503 
individual commercials that were broadcast during the 2001–2005 period, 346 of which had missing 
video files. Each individual advertisement was usually shown multiple times.   
We organize these three data sources (product characteristics and sales data, advertising 
expenditures and content data, and medical efficacy data) into one final dataset. The observation in 
this final data set is a unique advertisement creative – month, and variables that are associated with 
each such observation are the following: advertising expenditures on a specific advertisement 
creative in a specific month, advertising content for that advertisement creative (coded), brand sales 
during that month, generic counterpart sales during that month and product quality (based on 
medical data) associated with the active ingredient of advertised brand.  
 
5. 2. Measuring Information Content 
The widely used Resnik and Stern (1977) method for measuring advertising information categorizes 
the information provided in advertisements into 14 distinct “information cues,” including price, 
quality, performance, components, availability, special offers, taste, nutrition, packaging, 
warranties, safety, independent research, company research, and new ideas. More than 60 studies 
have applied the Resnik and Stern approach to measure the information content of advertising in 
different media (Chou, Franke, and Wilcox, 1987; Harmon, Razzouk, and Stern, 1983; Stern and 
Resnik, 1991), countries (Hong, Muderrisoglu, and Zinkhan, 1987; Madden, Caballero, and 
Matsukubo, 1986), and product categories (Stern, Krugman, and Resnik 1981). The results have 
varied markedly, even within the same medium, because of the lack of a multivariate statistical 
analysis, redundant or too broad definitions of information cues, and small sample size (Abernethy 
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and Franke, 1996).  The main advantage of the Resnik and Stern classification system is the general 
nature of the information cue categories, which allow for comparison of products from multiple 
industries. However, this advantage is also a disadvantage. Categorizing advertising information 
content into coarse categories inevitably omits some information that consumers might find 
important. For example, in the OTC analgesics industry, two distinct information cues (e.g., fast and 
strong) would be coded as one “performance” cue in the Resnik and Stern classification system.  
Our attribute coding approach documents every attribute mentioned. For each 
advertisement, we recorded whether the commercial had any comparative claims and, if so, the 
specific claim (e.g., faster, stronger). We also noted all information cues mentioned, including the 
purpose of the drug (e.g., arthritis, headache), drug efficiency (e.g., strength, speed), safety, and 
other characteristics. The type of information cues that were mentioned (e.g., “strong”) are clearly 
identifiable, which enables us to avoid making any subjective judgments while coding the 
information content. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is industry-specific. However, 
focusing on a specific industry is now the standard approach in empirical industrial organization 
(Bresnahan, 1989).  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Information Disclosure, Vertical Attributes, Ad Spending and Sales
Information Disclosure Vertical Characteristics1 Advertising and Sales 
Brand Number  of Cues 
Compa-
rative?  NNT 
GI 
Risk
CV 
Risk
Relative 
Speed  
Avg 
Monthly 
Spending 
per Ad  
Average 
Monthly 
Sales 
Total Ad 
Spending 
Total 
Sales 
Ad to 
Sales 
Ratio 
Advil 3.6 0.74 2.40 2.00 1.44 1 $0.14 $23.92 $293.10 $1,374 21.30% 
(1.004) (0.441) (0.241) (1.693) 
Aleve 3.77 0.9 2.30 9.10 1.44 3 $0.12 $11.41 $174.80 $659 26.50% 
(1.156) (0.298) (0.293) (1.123) 
Bayer 3.19 0.31 4.00 3.10 1.07 4 $0.10 $7.95 $131.20 $458 28.80% 
(1.320) (0.461) (0.222) (0.964) 
Excedrin 2.4 0.15 3.86 1.67 1.26 2 $0.26 $12.39 $182.40 $689 26.50% 
(0.695) (0.359) (0.456) (1.172) 
Motrin 2.61 0.37 2.40 2.00 1.44 1 $0.10 $8.03 $102.00 $466 21.90% 
(0.937) (0.484) (0.240) (0.762) 
Tylenol 2.54 0.28 3.80 1.00 1.35 2 $0.13 $40.59 $414.90 $2,328 17.80% 
  (0.957) (0.449) (0.346) (3.195) 
Notes: 1 Larger number implies weaker performance. These are relative risk and performance measures taken from peer-reviewed medical 
literature. See Appendix for more details. 
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We quantify or rank all of the “true” characteristics that were used in advertising associated 
with each active ingredient as follows. First, we interpret “fast” as the time taken to achieve 
perceptible or meaningful pain relief (medical literature calls this “onset to perceptible pain relief”). 
Second, we interpret claims about strength (e.g., “strong,” “stronger,” “tougher on pain”) as the 
maximum level of pain relief achieved; we use the number-needed-to-treat (NNT) measure to 
approximate analgesic efficiency claims. Finally, we collect reported data on gastrointestinal and 
cardiovascular risks (GI Risk and CV Risk, respectively) for each of the active ingredients. 
Appendix A describes these measures in greater detail and presents a list of peer-reviewed medical 
articles that quantify these performance attributes. The first two columns of Table 1 also present 
each brand’s (expenditure-weighted) average number of information cues mentioned in ads as well 
as the incidence of comparative ads. We also add advertising spending and sales descriptive 
statistics to Table 1.  
 
Figure 2. Advertised Attributes and Expenditures 
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During our analyzed period, 30 different product attributes were mentioned. Figure 2 
represents the top 23 attributes and shows the advertising expenditures (in millions of dollars) spent 
on advertising those attributes during the sample period.11 We separate advertising expenditures by 
type of advertisement (comparative versus self-promotional). The attributes “fast,”  “strong,” “long 
lasting,” and “trust and/or safety” are among the top five most heavily advertised attributes. These 
attributes are directly related to the inherent (exogenous) chemical characteristics of each active 
ingredient in each analyzed brand. 
We examine the attribute usage correlations to investigate whether the coded cues represent 
distinct information. For example, although we code “strong” and “fast” as separate information 
categories, we also ensure that the coded information categories are indeed distinct information 
cues. Table 2 portrays the correlation matrix of cue usage and shows that the cue descriptors that we 
use are distinctive. For example, both “fast” and “strong” are often used together, but they are also 
used separately in more than half of the occurrences (in dollar terms).12 Thus, two cues may be used 
together frequently, but each still provides consumers with important information. “Strong” denotes 
how powerful the medicine is, and “fast” denotes the speed of the onset of pain relief.  
Our careful coding and investigation of cue correlations (see Table 2 and Figure 2) suggest 
that the number of coded attributes within an advertisement is a reasonable approximation of the 
information content. We use these information cue numbers as our dependent variable in our 
empirical estimation described below.  
 
                                                 
11 The remaining 7 attributes (not reported) had negligible advertising expenditures. The sum of the expenditures in 
Figure 2 exceeds total ad spending because many advertisements promote multiple characteristics and, for the purpose 
of this Figure only, we attributed total ad spending to each characteristic mentioned.   
 
12 There are two instances of high correlation that merit comment. First, whenever “liquid gels” are mentioned, “fast” is 
almost always mentioned. Second, “long lasting” and “fewer pills” are used together 33% of the time. Conversely, when 
“fewer pills” are mentioned, long lasting was mentioned 88% of the time. We experimented with providing an umbrella 
classification that encompasses both, but the differences in the results were minor. 
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Table 2. Matrix of Frequency of Attributes that are Mentioned Together 
   Fast  Strong 
Head‐
ache 
Long 
lasting  Safe  Arthritis 
Dr. 
recomm 
Liquid 
gels 
Legs/ 
muscle 
Gentle 
on 
stomach  Back 
Fewer 
pills  Total 
Fast     $251.61  $296.52  $70.25  $32.76  $23.80  $16.69  $204.55  $101.42  $66.32  $25.65  0  $613.52 
      49.32%  78.63%  23.22%  11.17%  8.77%  6.70%  98.90%  49.52%  56.98%  22.11%  0    
Strong  $251.61     $126.43  $103.37  $93.88  $123.06  $97.80  $140.66  $133.31  $45.46  $51.94  $53.01  $510.20 
   41.01%     33.53%  34.16%  32.02%  45.34%  39.28%  68.01%  65.10%  39.05%  44.78%  46.81%    
Headache  $296.52  $126.43     $6.22  $28.85  $11.95  $25.42  $84.88  $17.53  $24.40  $15.88  $6.22  $377.09 
   48.33%  24.78%     2.06%  9.84%  4.40%  10.21%  41.04%  8.56%  20.96%  13.69%  5.49%    
Long 
lasting 
$70.25  $103.37  $6.22     $68.50  $153.97  $83.96  $14.43  $64.17  $23.18  $44.99  $100.06  $302.56 
11.45%  20.26%  1.65%     23.36%  56.73%  33.72%  6.98%  31.34%  19.91%  38.79%  88.35%    
Safe  $32.76  $93.88  $28.85  $68.50     $115.84  $77.64  $5.51  $29.96  $55.50  $39.29  $30.46  $293.20 
   5.34%  18.40%  7.65%  22.64%     42.68%  31.18%  2.67%  14.63%  47.68%  33.87%  26.90%    
Arthritis   $23.80  $123.06  $11.95  $153.97  $115.84     $125.59  $21.58  $18.38  $55.21  $19.22  $80.12  $271.42 
   3.88%  24.12%  3.17%  50.89%  39.51%     50.43%  10.43%  8.97%  47.43%  16.57%  70.75%    
Dr. 
recomm. 
$16.69  $97.80  $25.42  $83.96  $77.64  $125.59     0  $23.88  $38.35  $4.71  $50.65  $249.02 
2.72%  19.17%  6.74%  27.75%  26.48%  46.27%     0  11.66%  32.95%  4.06%  44.73%    
Liquid 
gels 
$204.55  $140.66  $84.88  $14.43  $5.51  $21.58  0     $23.06  $44.74  0  0  $206.82 
33.34%  27.57%  22.51%  4.77%  1.88%  7.95%  0     11.26%  38.43%  0  0    
Legs/ 
muscle 
$101.42  $133.31  $17.53  $64.17  $29.96  $18.38  $23.88  $23.06     $23.06  $56.44  $7.54  $204.79 
16.53%  26.13%  4.65%  21.21%  10.22%  6.77%  9.59%  11.15%     19.81%  48.66%  6.65%    
Gentle on 
stomach 
$66.32  $45.46  $24.40  $23.18  $55.50  $55.21  $38.35  $44.74  $23.06     $0.88  0  $116.40 
10.81%  8.91%  6.47%  7.66%  18.93%  20.34%  15.40%  21.63%  11.26%     0.76%  0    
Back 
$25.65  $51.94  $15.88  $44.99  $39.29  $19.22  $4.71  0  $56.44  $0.88  $14.83  $115.98 
4.18%  10.18%  4.21%  14.87%  13.40%  7.08%  1.89%  0  27.56%  0.76%     13.10%    
Fewer 
pills 
0  $53.01  $6.22  $100.06  $30.46  $80.12  $50.65  0  $7.54  0  $14.83     $113.25 
0  10.39%  1.65%  33.07%  10.39%  29.52%  20.34%  0  3.68%  0  12.79%       
 
 
6. Identification Strategy 
 
A brand’s decision about how much information to include in an advertisement is likely to be made 
simultaneously with the decision about the type of advertisement (comparative or self-promotional). 
Therefore, these two decisions are interdependent, in much the same way as equilibrium price and 
quantity are determined at the same time in a simple demand–supply model. In other words, there is 
some unobservable exogenous variable that explains both the information content and whether that 
content is a self-promotional or comparative advertisement. For example, a higher-quality brand 
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might provide less information and have more comparative advertisements than a lower-quality 
brand.  
The other two potentially endogenous explanatory variables that we consider are the 
measures of the market share of a brand and the market share of a brand’s generic counterpart. To 
see why endogeneity might be an issue, note that market size and information content are outcomes 
of brands’ strategic interactions, and a fully structural equilibrium model would specify three 
equations, one for each of the three variables (information content, market size, and the generic 
counterpart’s market size). Here, we estimate only one of the three equations—the one that explains 
information content as a function of the other two endogenous variables—but we control for the 
endogeneity of the other two variables. Equivalently, we could consider an unobservable variable 
(e.g., quality) that is correlated with the brand’s market size and information content. By omitting 
that variable from our regressions, we would introduce a bias into the estimation of the parameters 
of the model.  
We use an instrumental variable approach to determine whether our concerns about the 
endogenous variables are empirically relevant. Instruments that correlate with sales and advertising 
but not with unobserved quality provide information on how important the endogeneity problem is 
likely to be. Our main identification strategy is to use variation in generic prices as the exogenous 
source of variation in the industry.  
The crucial observation for our identification strategy is that all of the patents for the active 
ingredients of the OTC analgesics have expired. The patent for naproxen was the last one to expire 
– in 1993. After patents expire, generic counterparts are produced and sold at prices that are 
substantially lower than the brand name product (Aleve). As time passes, new entry of generic 
competitors brings the price of the generic counterpart down to marginal cost, as shown by 
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and discussed by Ching (2004) and Scott Merton (2004). If the 
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marginal cost is constant and the generic prices are set at the marginal cost, then the generic prices 
are independent of the prices set by the national brands and can be appropriately used as 
instrumental variables.13 14 
More specifically, we include functions of a brand’s active ingredient generic counterpart 
prices and generic prices of a brand’s competitors (constructed means, squared and cubed terms). 
We also construct interactions between generic prices (own and competitors’) and a dummy 
indicating that a firm produces multiple brands. Finally, we interact the characteristics with the 
2005 year dummy to capture advertising content changes—2005 was considered one of the most 
turbulent years in the analgesics industry.15 We discuss in detail our identification strategy and the 
instrumental variables in the online supplement. 
To deal with the endogenous variables in our nonlinear ordered probit model, we follow 
Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) proposed approach. First, we rewrite the information content as 
ߙ௜ െ ܺߚ െ ݓߛ ൌ ݌̅ െ ܫ ̅ െ ூሚ೔௦̅ , where ݓ is a vector of the three endogenous variables. The main 
identification assumption is that instruments are not correlated with the error term (i.e., ሺܼᇱ߳ሻ ൌ 0ሻ. 
Here, ܼ includes all of the exogenous variables, such as brand characteristics (ܺሻ and functions 
(here, the average) of the characteristics of the brand’s competitors. We use a two-step procedure 
described in Rivers and Vuong (1988). First, we run an ordinary least squares regression, ݓ ൌ ܼߜ ൅
߭, where ߭ is not observed and is the omitted variable that generates the endogeneity problem. This 
                                                 
13 We check to make sure that there is no downward trend in the generic price data, the existence of which would 
suggest that generic prices have not yet flattened out as predicted by Grabowski and Vernon (1992). Fortunately, the 
scatter plots of average generic prices in each period exhibit fluctuations around the same level. The expectation that the 
generic prices will show a downward trend in the data is a characteristic of younger drug markets (where the switch to 
off-patent occurred relatively recently). In our situation, the generic and branded markets are mature and they have 
coexisted for decades, hence, it is not surprising that our generic prices do not exhibit such a downward trend. We thank 
an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this test of instrument validity. See also the online supplement. 
14 Notice that we can allow generic brands to charge prices that are higher than marginal costs as long as this is 
explained by local conditions that national brands do not take into account when they set their prices. 
15 The growth of information content during 2005 is most likely due to the FDA’s announcement of the results of a 
clinical study, at the end of 2004, which indicated that patients taking naproxen sodium (Aleve) may be at an increased 
risk of heart attack or stroke (the withdrawal of Vioxx was also associated with this clinical study). By the end of 
January 2005, sales of Aleve plummeted by more than 50%, suffering the largest decline in brand history. 
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first stage regression yields residuals ො߭, which we include in the ordered probit in the second stage 
of the estimation.16 We report first stage R2 results in the footnote of Table 3.  The estimation of this 
ordered probit provides consistent estimates of all of the parameters.  Here, we are not interested in 
the magnitude of the parameters of the information content relationship (i.e., ߚ) but rather in the 
marginal effects of a change in the endogenous variables, which we can consistently estimate using 
Blundell and Powell’s (2003) approach.  
 
 7. Empirical Findings 
 
Table 3 reports the findings of the various specifications estimated with our data. We investigate 
whether brands with higher vertical quality transmit more information, by associating the number of 
information cues (our dependent variable) with the values of the exogenous medical characteristics 
of the active ingredients. The first column of Table 3 includes number-needed-to treat (NNT), 
relative speed, and measures of cardiovascular and gastrointestinal risk as such explanatory 
variables17.  
Our results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. Overall, the results 
in the first column of Table 3 suggest that there is a positive relationship between the amount of 
information provided and a stronger vertical differentiation of the brands. Keeping all else constant, 
we find that brands with inherently stronger pain relief have advertisements with more information 
content. As explained in the Appendix A, for NNT (as well as for Relative Speed, CV Risk and GI 
Risk), a higher number implies worse performance and a less effective drug. Thus, the negative 
                                                 
16 The variable Comparative is a dummy variable. Here we run a linear probability model. 
17 We transform the branded and generic sales numbers as well as vertical characteristics levels into standardized 
values. Essentially we produce a variable with mean zero and standard deviation 1: such standardized variable 
represents how many standard deviations each observation is from the mean (which is zero).   
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coefficient on NNT is consistent with strong and efficient drugs having more information in their 
advertisements. We find a similar pattern for brands that have lower gastrointestinal and 
cardiovascular risks: their advertisements also tend to be more informative. Finally, consistent with 
our theoretical framework, brands that offer faster relief also have more information content. 
 
 
 Table 3. Determinants of Information Disclosure  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Comparative? 0.476*** 0.968*** 
(0.026) (0.077) 
Standardized Sales 0.445*** 0.309*** 
(0.027) (0.036) 
Standardized Sales Squared -0.204*** -0.130*** 
(0.017) (0.021) 
Standardized Generic Sales -0.136*** -0.140*** 
(0.043) (0.045) 
Standardized NNT -0.724*** -0.785*** -0.670*** 
(0.029) (0.047) (0.050) 
Relative Speed 0.336*** 0.260*** 0.198*** 
(0.041) (0.047) (0.048) 
Standardized GI Risk -0.133*** -0.151*** -0.189*** 
(0.035) (0.056) (0.059) 
Standardized CV Risk -0.151*** -0.478*** -0.465*** 
(0.029) (0.053) (0.054) 
Residuals-Comparative -0.557*** 
(0.082) 
Residuals-Sales -0.175** 
(0.068) 
Residuals-Generic Sales -0.167*** 
      (0.041) 
Cutoff (0->1 Cues) -3.085*** 
(0.194) 
Cutoff (1->2 Cues) -1.041*** -1.199*** -1.042*** 
(0.090) (0.100) (0.104) 
Cutoff (2->3 Cues) 0.291*** 0.196** 0.360*** 
(0.089) (0.098) (0.103) 
Cutoff (3->4 Cues) 1.095*** 1.054*** 1.218*** 
(0.090) (0.099) (0.103) 
Cutoff (4->5 Cues) 2.032*** 2.029*** 2.196*** 
(0.091) (0.100) (0.105) 
Cutoff (5->6 Cues) 3.034*** 3.035*** 3.213*** 
  (0.097) (0.105) (0.109) 
# of Obs. 9739  9708  9708  
Log-Likelihood -13847.5 -13378.8 -13351.8 
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Bootstrapped standard errors reported in 
Column 4. Endogenous variables: Comparative?, Standardized Sales, Standardized 
Generic Sales. Instrumental Variables: Functions of Generic Prices. The first stage R2 
for endogenous variables is the following: Comparative? - R2 =.35, Standardized 
Sales - R2= 0.96, Standardized Generic Sales - R2=0.77) 
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The cutoffs estimated in these regressions have a clear interpretation. In particular, we 
showed that ߙ௜ାଵ െ ߙ௜ ൌ ூ೔ିூ೔శభ௦̅ .  In our analysis ̅ݏ is unknown, so assume for the sake of 
interpretation that ̅ݏ ൌ 1.18 Then, for each i we can compute the difference Ii - Ii+1, which is the 
incremental benefit of the ith information cue i. Consider the case of i=5. Then, ܫହ െ ܫ଺ ൌ 1.002. 
We can then find the point (6, 1.002) in Figure 3 to represent the empirical analogue of the 
theoretical incremental benefit corresponding to six information cues that we had derived in Panel B 
of Figure 2. We can replicate this exercise for the case of i=4, for which the scatter point will 
correspond to (5, 1.939), which is equal to 1.002 + 0.937. By repeating this exercise for all i = 
1,…,6, we derive the scatter plot in Figure 3. What we see in Figure 3 is remarkably similar to what 
we derive theoretically in Panel B of Figure 1: there is a fundamental trade-off between information 
and persuasion content that firms face when preparing an advertisement. This relationship, 
depicting the diminishing marginal returns to information, holds in every specification that we 
estimate and looks very similar to the one illustrated in Figure 3.  
Figure 3.  Estimated Decreasing Marginal Returns of Informative Content 
 
                                                 
18 Instead of normalizing ̅ݏ ൌ 1, one could also report ఈ೔శభିఈ೔ఈలିఈభ , but that would only rescale Figure 2. The normalization ̅ݏ ൌ 1 gives a more intuitive interpretation for Figure 2. 
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In Column 2 we include the variables that approximate brand share, brand share squared (to 
capture a possible nonlinear relationship), and the share of the brand’s generic counterpart19.  
To begin with, the evidence is also consistent with a relatively large spillover effect from 
informative advertising, as predicted by the theoretical model. We find that branded firms include 
less information content when the size of their generic competitors is large because the parameter of 
standardized generic sales is negative.  
Next, we consider the other relationships of interest discussed in Section 4. First, we find 
that the largest brands transmit less information than the rest of the brands. Second, we find that the 
comparative advertising dummy is highly statistically significant and positive. This result indicates 
that comparative advertisements have more informational cues than self-promotional ads and that 
the likelihood that an advertisement is comparative increases with the number of cues.  Note that 
comparative advertisements will always have at least one cue because a brand must compare itself 
with another brand along at least one dimension. Therefore, the analysis examines whether 
comparative and self-promotional advertising information content is different, conditional on 
having at least one information cue. Here, we treat the choice of using a comparative advertisement 
as an exogenous variable. 
In Column 3 we follow an instrumental variable approach to estimate the effect of 
comparative advertisements, sales, and generic sales on information content. Column 3 uses the 
generic prices as instrumental variables. The results in Column 3 are those that we will use to 
discuss the main implications of our analysis. We find that the estimated coefficient of comparative 
advertisements is larger than in Column 2, implying that comparative advertisements have more 
information content than self-promotional advertisements and that such information content is 
                                                 
19 Since only the relative market share position is important in our empirical model, we approximate brand and generic 
counterpart market shares with standardized values of respective monthly sales. 
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significantly higher than under the exogenous treatment. The strong endogeneity of this dummy 
variable is confirmed by the estimated coefficient of the control function, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the variable 
“Comparative” is endogenous (Smith and Blundell, 1986). Therefore, our omitted variable concern 
in this setting is valid, and such unobserved quality is associated with the attractiveness of having 
comparative advertisements.  
Both the coefficient on standardized sales and on the squared standardized sales are smaller 
in absolute value than in Column 2, suggesting a flatter, but still negative, relationship between 
brand shares and information content. The coefficient estimate of the control function is statistically 
significant, confirming the endogeneity of shares. 
 Finally, the marginal impact of the generic counterpart’s market share is the same as in 
Column 2, suggesting that its endogeneity is not empirically significant. The coefficient is negative, 
implying the negative relationship between the generic counterpart and information disclosure, as 
suggested by our extended theoretical framework. 
To understand the economic importance of the results regarding a brand and its generic 
counterpart market sizes, we construct figures that associate a brand’s probability of choosing a 
given amount of information (i.e., a certain number of cues) with the distribution of a brand’s share 
and the share of the market for a generic substitute (at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
percentiles of market share distribution). For example, Figure 4 shows that the likelihood of an 
advertisement including only one cue increases sharply with size. In contrast, the probability of 
observing an advertisement with four or more cues decreases with size. Specifically, a move from 
the 10th percentile in the size distribution to the 90th percentile increases the probability of 
providing only one cue by approximately 16%. Similarly, Figure 5 represents the changes in the 
likelihood that an advertisement includes a certain number of information cues depending on the 
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size of the generic counterpart market share. For example, the likelihood that a product with a large 
generic counterpart will include one information cue is approximately 10% higher than the 
likelihood that a product with a small generic counterpart will include one information cue. The 
converse is true for three or more information cues: brands with smaller generic counterparts are 
significantly more likely to include more information in their advertisements. 
 
Figure 4. Marginal effects on Information Disclosure by Brand Share 
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Figure 5. Marginal effects on Information Disclosure by Generic Counterpart Share 
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Otherwise, it might be assumed that larger brands are fundamentally of higher quality than smaller 
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brands and, therefore, their advertisements should have more information content. Correcting for 
endogeneity, we also show that more competition from generics gives rise to less information 
transmission by branded products, which is in line with the view that there are significant spillovers 
to informative advertising. Finally, we quantify the extent to which comparative advertisements 
have significantly more information content than self-promotional ones, and find that this effect is 
much larger than would be predicted without correcting for endogeneity.  
From a methodological standpoint, we describe a method that is appropriate for dealing with 
information content with multiple explanatory variables, and show how the analysis can be 
corrected for endogeneity and how this alters the results. Our empirical analysis is restrictive in 
several aspects, and therefore suggests extensions that constitute themes for further research into 
information content. First, further research could use a sub-classification of cues (e.g., into vertical 
cues such as “fast” that all consumers would appreciate, or horizontal cues such as “headache” or 
“menstrual pain” that only some consumers desire) to explore the differential content of various cue 
types. Second, an information cue can be deployed only if a product has the attribute communicated 
in the cue, and can be used comparatively only if a product has an advantage over another product. 
Thus, further research might examine the amount of information advertised as a function of the total 
number of cues that could feasibly be advertised. Likewise, investigating whether products use 
comparative advertisements more often against similar or dissimilar products would be an 
interesting extension. Third, we do not examine product advertising campaigns in which 
advertisements address a subset of themes over a limited horizon. Fourth, we code only the 
objective content of advertisements as quantified by their reference of specific characteristics and 
competitors. We recognize that advertising may persuade through channels other than pure 
information, thereby leading consumers to act on emotional factors. While our paper recognizes that 
the trade-off between persuasive and informative content of an ad exists, we have not attempted to 
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code persuasive effects. The primary purpose of the empirical component of this paper was to 
measure the objective content of advertising along the lines of traditional content analysis, and 
incorporating the subjective side would be an important aspect to explore in future research. Finally, 
we do not address whether the market provision of information is optimal, how valuable the 
information is to consumers (Ippolito and Pappalardo, 2002; Pappalardo and Ringold, 2000), or 
how government policy towards advertising content might affect promotion effectiveness (Goldfarb 
and Tucker, 2011). Instead, the purpose of this paper was to document empirical regularities present 
in the data, rationalized via our information-persuasion trade-off theoretical framework, and to 
provide measures of the fundamental variables that can be used to answer such questions.  
Our content analysis methodology can readily be applied to other product categories and 
industries. Extensions of the proposed methodology could be applied to answer questions such as: 
How does advertising information content differ for experience, search, and credence products? 
Does the relationship between brand size and information hold in more broad contexts? Do new 
products provide more information? These questions should hold both empirical and theoretical 
interest.  
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APPENDIX A 
Vertical Product Performance and Medical Measures 
 
We reviewed 10 peer-reviewed medical journal articles to collect efficiency measures for: 
 Strength (Numbers Needed To Treat (NNT)); 
 Speed (Onset to perceptible pain relief (Relative Speed));  
 Gastrointestinal side effects  (Gastrointestinal risk (GI risk));  
 Cardiovascular side effects (Cardiovascular risk (CV risk).  
 
These 4 efficacy measures for each brand are reported in Table 1. 
 
The peer-reviewed medical literature provides objective risk and efficiency measures for each 
product, based on its active ingredient (or combination of ingredients), strength, and recommended 
dosage. Each active ingredient has definitive maximum doses and durations of therapy. Differences 
exist across active ingredients in terms of the important safety issue of the potential for 
gastrointestinal toxicity and cardiovascular risk as well as relative strength and onset to perceptible 
pain relief. We collected the measurable characteristics for maximum OTC recommended dosage 
(single dose): Ibuprofen: 400 mg; naproxen sodium: 440 mg; aspirin: 1000 mg; and acetaminophen: 
– 1000 mg.  
Relative risk is the risk of an event (e.g., developing a disease) relative to exposure. Relative risk is 
the ratio of the probability of the event (E) occurring in the exposed group versus the control 
(nonexposed) group: 
 
ܴܴ ൌ Pr ሺܧ|ݐݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐሻPr ሺܴ|ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ሻ  
 
Relative risk is used frequently in clinical trial data to compare the risk of developing a disease in 
people not receiving the new medical treatment (or receiving a placebo) versus people receiving an 
established (standard of care) treatment. In the case of the gastrointestinal (GI Risk) and 
cardiovascular relative risk (CV Risk) numbers used herein, we use them to compare the risk of 
developing a side effect in people receiving a drug with people who do not receive the treatment (or 
receive a placebo). Thus, a cardiovascular relative risk of 1.44 means that cardiovascular problems 
arise with 44% higher likelihood using the drug (versus placebo).  
The number needed to treat (NNT) is an epidemiological measure used in assessing the 
effectiveness of a health-care intervention, typically a treatment with medication. The NNT is the 
average number of patients who need to be treated to prevent one additional bad outcome (i.e. the 
number of patients that need to be treated for one to benefit compared with a control in a clinical 
trial). It is defined as the inverse of the absolute risk reduction. The ideal NNT is 1, where everyone 
improves with treatment and no one improves with control. The higher the NNT, the less effective 
is the treatment. More specifically, NNT is used with respect to two treatments, A and B, with A 
typically a drug and B a placebo. If the probabilities P୅ and P୆ under treatments A and B, 
respectively, are known, we can compute NNT as follows:  
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ܰܰܶ ൌ 1P୆ െ P୅ 
 
The NNT for a given therapy is simply the reciprocal of the absolute risk reduction (ARR= P୆ െ P୅) 
for that treatment. For example, in a hypothetical migraine study, if risk decreased from P୆= .30 
without treatment with drug M to P୅ = .05 with treatment with drug M, for a relative risk of .17 
(.05/.3), a relative risk reduction of .83 ([.3 – .05]/.3), and an absolute risk reduction of .25 (.3 – 
.05), the NNT would be 1/.25, or 4. In clinical terms, an NNT of 4 means that four patients need to 
be treated with drug M to prevent migraine from recurring in one patient. Typically, the lower the 
NNT number, the more potent and efficient the treatment is.  
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